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Indianapolis De on: 
Segregative Intent and the Interdistrict Remedy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The desegregation of this nation's public schools has, since 1954, 
posed a series of nearly intractable problems for the federal ju-
diciary. In that year, the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson 1 was discarded for the public schools, and a new era in 
education and law was born in the Supreme Court opinion of Brown 
v. Board of Education (Brown fl.2 Brown I was the result of a 
carefully planned and executed campaign by the NAACP against 
legally segregated school systems.3 School districts from South 
Carolina, Virginia, Kansas. and Delaware were initially confronted 
and combined in this case.• The Supreme Court held "that the plain-
tiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been 
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment"5 because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal."8 
The Court said that the inequality perceived in segregated 
schools stems not from the tangible aspects of education 7 but rather 
from the fact that "[s]egregation with the sanction of law ... has a 
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of 
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they 
would receive in a racially integrated school system."8 When the in-
equality appears on the face of a state statute,9 the violation is ob-
• 
1163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
2347 u.s. 483 (1954) (Brown n. 
3AFRO·AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIMARY SOURCES 365 (T. Frazier ed. 1970) . 
. 
4347 U.S. at 483 n. •. It is interesting to note that two of the cases- those from 
Kansas and Delaware- were in northern states but were combined with the southern 
cases because the segregation of the public school facilities was mandated by state law 
in all four. See id. at 486·87 n.l. 
5/d. at 495. 
"I d. 
1ld. at 492 . 
8ld. at 494. 
'The following are examples of facially segregative laws: uThe Trustee or 
Trustees of each township, town or city, shall organize the colored children into 
separate schools, having aU the rights and privileges of other schools of the township." 
Act of May 13, 1869, ch. 16, § 3 1869 Ind. Acts (Spec. Sess.) 41, as amended by Act of 
March 5, 1877, ch. 81, § 1, 1877 Ind. Acts 124 (repealed by Act of March 8, 1949, ch. 
186, §§ 1·8, 1949 Ind. Acts 603 (replaced by IND. CODE §§ 20-8.1-2-1 to -7 (1976)) ... It shall 
be unlawful for pupils of one race to attend the schools provided by the boards of 
• 
799 
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viously offensive and is clearly subject to the strictures of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment" Such laws inevitably 
create a dual system of education wherein blacks and whites each 
have their own schools. Therefore. problems of desegregating racially 
segregated schools arise predominantly when state action is subtle 
and the intent to create a dual system is less defined. This situation is 
more likely to be confronted in the North than in the South because 
southern legislators promulgated more facially segregative laws!0 
The Indianapolis desegregation case, 11 spanning twelve years of 
litigation, is, in many respects, a prototype of school desegregation 
actions in the North" The actions creating the segregative condition 
were often facially neutral. Yet, the case is unique because the inter-
district remedy suggested by District Judge Dillin in 1971 12 was 
relatively innovative. Interdistrict remedies had rarely been con-
sidered, much less implemented, up to that time.13 The Indianapolis 
litigation is also unique for the very reason that there was a nine· 
year delay between the 1971 remedy and its "acceptance" in 1980 by 
the Supreme Court.14 Because each school desegregation case encom-
passes a different factual situation, it is extremely difficult for the 
judiciary, inexperienced in the field of education, to formulate a 
coherent and cohesive body of law. The Indianapolis case can be 
viewed both as a stage in the evolving case law on desegregation 
and as one of the many disparate decisions ratified on a case-by-case 
basis by a Court grappling with the almost insurmountable task 
created by Brown I. 
trustees for persons of another race.'' S.C. CODE § 59-63-10 (1976). uWhite and colored 
children shall not be taught in the same school." VA. CoNST. of 1902 § 140 (repealed by 
VA. CONST. art., VIII. § 1 (1971)). 
10Wright. Public School Desegregation: Legal Re_medies for De Facto Sf3gre-
gation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285, 287 (1965). 
11The litigation included many published opinions: United Sta,tes v ~ Board of 
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S~D. Ind. 1971), aff.d, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Indianapolis I]; United States v. Board 
of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind.) [hereinafter cited as Indianapolis II], 
supp. mem. of decision, 368 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Ind. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Jn .. 
dianapolis Ill], aff'd in part, -rev·d in part., and remanded, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929, on rem-and, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Indianapolis IV], aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded 
sub nom., Bowen v. United States, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), on remand, 573 F.2d 400 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978), on remand, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Indianapolis VJ, aff'd, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. 
Ct. 114 (1980). References to the litigation in this Note will be to the specific bracketed 
appellations. 
t
2/ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 679. 
l3See note 65 infra and accompanying text. 
14United States v. Board of School Comm·rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 114 (1980). 
I 
I 
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The purpose of this Note is to analyze the constitutional viola-
tion and the subsequent imposition of an interdistrict remedy in In-
dianapolis. The Indianapolis case will be compared with other case 
law with respect to the finding of segregative intent and will be 
reconciled with major decisions in other public school cases. This 
reconciliation will point out the infirmities in the Indianapolis opin-
ions which enable them to be harmonized with other decisions. This 
Note will also indicate why the interdistrict remedy in Indianapolis 
would today probably be accepted on a lesser standard of segre-
gative intent than the lower courts' opinions indicate. 
II. NORTHERN SEGREGATION 
The plight of black pupils in the North began with southern 
racial attitudes and the great migrations of black families from the 
South in the first decades of the twentieth century .15 Great numbers 
of blacks, discouraged by agricultural conditions in the South and 
enticed by the industrial North, arrived at their new urban homes 
and found themselves segregated from their white neighbors.16 Al-
though some northern legislatures had enacted facially segregative 
laws,17 most northern segregation was the result of private 
discrimination, poverty, and a strong cultural identity creating 
distinct black metropolitan ghettos. 18 
Today, this isolation is perpetuated in school districts where 
there exists a strong policy to send children to schools near their 
homes: "[I]t is becoming apparent that perhaps the primary cause of 
... segregation in urban schools is the socio-economic conditions of 
the Negro .... Segregation results from adherence to the neighbor-
hood school assignment policy ." 19 City schools become even more 
racially identifiable as a result of "white flight"- the fleeing of 
white families from inner cities to outlying areas. This type of 
school segregation, called de facto segregation, is racial separation 
caused by forces unconnected to any purposeful state action20 and as 
such has traditionally not been considered amenable to remedy.. De 
15See AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIMARY SOURCES 249-51 (T. Frazier ed. 1970). 
16/d. "Between the years 1910 and 1920, the black population increased in Detroit 
by 611.3 per cent, in Cleveland by 307.8 per cent, in Gary (Indiana) hy 1,283.6 per cent.. 
in Chicago by 148.2 per cent." /d. at 249. 
17Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 124, 124 (197 4). 
'
8See Spear, The Origins of the Urban Ghetto, 1870-1915, in 2 KEY ISSUES IN THE 
AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 153 (1971). 
1940 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 10, at 290. 
20J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-68 
(1978). Racially identifiable schools create the impression of a dual system. 
' 
' 
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jure segregation, on the other hand, is created by intentional state 
action and is unconstitutional and remediable. The equal protection 
issues in northern school desegregation cases, therefore, revolve 
around whether the current duality in schools was caused by the 
more "benign" de facto segregation or by de jure segregation. 
The emphasis upon finding segregative intent in northern cases 
was born in the Supreme Court decision in Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, Denver,21 the first major northern school case to reach the 
Court after Brown I. According to the majority in Keyes, only those 
acts that have the sanction of law and are intentionally segregative 
violate the Constitution.22 Therefore, the focus of a court's scrutiny 
in a northern case must be upon the actions which created a 
segregated school system. 
Northern schools sometimes became segregated by laws that 
either required or permitted segregation by their specific terms, as 
in the Kansas and Delaware lower court cases which led to Brown 
/.23 This situation makes the determination of the offense fairly simple. 
But intentionally segregative state action is much harder to find 
when facially neutral state action has created a segregated condition 
or aggravated existing de facto segregation. Such apparently neu-
tral acts as gerryma.ndered attendance boundaries,24 optional atten-
dance zones,25 free transfer systems,26 and faculty segregation27 have 
been imposed by local school boards, not by state statute.28 State 
21413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
22ld. at 198. 
23Brown v. Board of Educ .• 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951): Belton v. Gebhart, 32 
Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (1952). 
24Gerrymandering the attendance boundaries for each school building on racial 
lines to maintain segregation is a fairly common practice. See. e.g., Adams v. United 
States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 88 (1980); NAACP v. Lan-
sing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977). 
2r;Optional attendance zones give students in racially mixed residential areas the 
opportunity to select the school of their choice; the student's decision is usually based 
upon the predominant racial composition of the facility. E.g., United States v. Board of 
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 668 (S.D. Ind. 1971). 
2flStudents are able to attend schools outside their attendance zones and even out-
_side their districts when a school board has instituted a system of free transfer. E.g., 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (crossing attendance lines); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. 
Supp. 428, 433 (D. Del. 1975, (crossing district lines). 
270nce a dual system becomes apparent, it is not uncommon for a school board to 
assign teachers to buildings in accordance with their ·own race. E. g., United States v. 
Board of School Comm'rs. 332 F. Supp. 655, 665 (S.D. Ind. 1971): Davis v. School Dist., 
309 F. Supp. 734, 743 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
u.s. 913 (1971). 
28For the purpose of charging "state action .. under the fourteenth amendment, 
local school boards are considered agents of the state. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 
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legislatures have also become involved by formulating laws which 
change or in some manner affect school district boundaries.29 These 
kinds of state action will often have a disproportionate impact upon 
blacks, creating the appearance of a dual school system; however, 
absent a showing of an intent or purpose to racially segregate, no 
remediable cause of action exists.30 
The problem in northern cases becomes further compounded if, 
once de jure segregation within one district has been found, a 
desegregation order within that district would be futile. This situa-
tion typically occurs when a court believes that an intradistrict 
remedy either would accelerate "white flight" and create an iden· 
tifiably black district31 or would merely rearrange an already racially 
distinct district.32 In view of this dilemma, the utility of fashioning 
an interdistrict metropolitan remedy becomes apparent. Under an 
interdistrict remedy, adjacent, usually white, districts are united in 
some manner with the offending district in order to cure the con-
stitutional violation. The Indianapolis case revolves around this ad-
junct of the northern desegregation problem and exemplifies many 
of the problems surrounding the imposition of an interdistrict 
remedy. 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE INDIANAPOLIS CASE 
A. Segregation and Education in Indiana 
Prior to its becoming a state, Indiana was a part of the North-
west Territory, an immense area of land ceded to the United States 
. 
16 (1958). In Indiana, actions by school corporations are state actions because the 
schools are organized by the state's Department of Public Instruction. The state public 
school system is a state institution, thereby making the individual corporations agents 
of the state. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D. Ind. 
1971)~ 
"United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Higgins v. 
Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. 
Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). 
JtJSee Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). "We em-
phasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de 
facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate." /d. (emphasis in original). 
81United St.ates v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 676 (S.D. Ind. 1971). 
See text accompanying notes 68-69 infra. 
~~Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In the Milliken case, the District Court 
abruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-only plans on the grounds that "while [they) 
would provide a racial mix more in keeping with the Black-.White proportions of the 
student population [they] would accentuate the racial identifiability of the (Detroit) 
district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation:' Id. at. 
738-39 .. 
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by Virginia.33' Pro~slavery forces existed in the Indiana area, even 
before the territorial cession, as a result of a combination of French, 
British, and Virg·inian colonial influences.34 The pro-slavery factions 
were not defeated until statehood in 1816 when the state constitu-
tional convention adopted an anti-slavery clause.35 But old. racial at-
titudes were slow to die, and the Indiana General Assembly, as well 
as the constitutional conventions of 1816 and 1851. promulgated 
patently discriminatory statutes, some of which were not repealed 
until 1965.36 Blacks were separated from whites in most public 
places until after World War 1!37 and were often the subject of pri-
vate discrimination in the housing market.38 Early Indiana legis-
lators even went so far as to pass laws to exclude blacks and mulat-
tos from the state altogether.39 With this historical background, the 
problems that arose in education are easily understandable. 
. . 
In Indiana, the right to education was traditionally considered a 
right conferred only upon white citizens of the state.40 It was not 
until 1869, subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment 
to the United States Constitution, that education had to be provided 
for blacks,41 and the initial legislation required separate schools for 
black students.42 In 1877, the policy was made permissive by allow-
ing integration when separate schools were not available.'3 In 1949, 
legislation was adopted which prohibited school segregation and in-
cluded a gradual desegregation plan.•• But by then, de jure segrega-
tion had already done its damage. 
33G. COTTMAN, CENTENNIAL HISTORY AND HANDBOOK OF INDIANA 37 (1915). 
348. BoNDt JR., THE CIVILIZATION OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 154 (1934). 
ss/d. at 171. The anti-slavery clause that was adopted was from the Government 
Ordinance of 1787 which for.med the basic colonial structure of the Territory. /d. at 10, 
171. The clause had already been adopted in Ohio. /d. at 171. 
38/ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 660. One law, not repealed until 1965, declared 
marriages between whites and blacks void. 1 REV. STAT. ch. 67, § 2 (1852), cited in 332 
F. Supp. at 660. 
. 
37332 F. Supp. at 661. Such places included public hospitals, theatres, and state 
parks. /d. 
38/d. at 662-63~ 
391ND. CONST. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 (1852), cited in 332 F. Supp. at 661. 
40See, e.g., Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 334-35 (1850). 
••Indianapolis /, 322 F. Supp. at 663-64. 
42Aet of May 13, 1869, ch. 16, § 8, 1869 Ind. Acts 41. See note 9 supra. 
43See note 47 infra. 
••Act of Mar. 8, 1949, ch. 186. 1949 Ind. Acts 603 (currently codified at IND. CoDE 
§ 20·8.1-2-1 (1976)). This Act reads in part: 
[I]t is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Indiana to pro· 
vide, furnish, and make avai1able equal, non-segregated, non-discriminatory 
educational opportunities and facilities for all regardless of race, creed, na-
tional origin, color or sex . . . and to abolish, eliminate and prohibit 
1981] INTERDISTRICT BUSING 805 
The effect of the discriminatory legislative acts was most notice-
able in larger urban areas, particularly Gary and Indianapolis, 
where the black populations were more concentrated and isolated. 
Although the school boards of both Gary an:d Indianapolis adopte·d 
policies that seemed to foster segregation, only Indianapolis has ul-
timately been the subject of a desegregation order.45 The reason the 
focus has been on Indianapolis beomes apparent when one looks at 
the Indianapolis schools apart from the rest of the state. 
B. Segregat.ion in Indianapolis Schools 
From the beginning of state-supported education in Indiana. de 
jure elementary school segregation existed in Indianapolis;46 how-
ever, between 1877 and 1927, blacks and whites were allowed to go 
to the h.igh school of their choice. Indianapolis high schools were in-
tegrated during this period because the city had no separate high 
schools for blacks, and the 1877 legislative amendment to the segre· 
gration statute allowed integration if there were no separate 
schools_.7 In 1927, at the instigation of the Indianapolis Chamber of 
Commerce, Crispus Attucks High School was opened, and all black 
high school students were compelled to attend that school regard-
less of the distance they were required to travel.48 This new facility 
solidified and perpetuated the dual school system in Indianapolis. 
The school board failed to take advantage of the gradual desegrega,-
tion plan offered by the legislature in 194949 and thus later en· 
countered problems that might have been avoided. 
One of the critical dates in the Indianapolis case was 1954 when 
Brown I was decided.50 The Indianapolis school board, although adopt-
ing the policy of the 1949 statute, did not incorporate the true spirit 
segregated and separate schools or school districts on the basis of race, creed 
or c.olor .... 
!d. at § 1, 1949 Ind. Acts at 604. The desegregation of previously segregated schools 
was to be accomplished on a grade-by-grade basis so that effects of discrimination 
would be phased out rather than flatly abandoned. /d. at § 3, 1949 Ind. Acts at 604. 
. . 
45An action was brought against the Gary schools in 1963, but the complaint was 
dismissed for lack of a constitutional violation. Schools in the city were racial1y iden-
tifiable, but the court of appeals attributed this circ_umstance to de facto causes and 
held that there was no intent to discriminate. Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209, 
213 (7th Cir. 1963). 
48/ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 664. 
47/d. The amendment stated in pertinent part u[t)hat in case there may not be 
provided separate schools for the colored children, then such colored children shall be 
allowed to attend the public schools with white children." Act of Mar. 5, 1877, ch. 81, § 
l, 1877 Ind. Acts 124. 
48332 F. Supp. at 664. 
49See note 44 supra. 
!'10332 F. Supp. at 657-58. 
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of school desegregation into its actions. Construction policies and 
transfer plans tended to minimize any efforts at desegregation by a 
board which, until 1949, had built separate schools in racially 
distinct neighborhoods and had completely segregated the schools' 
faculties. 51 In the 1952-53 academic year, the board froze attendance 
boundaries along racially segregated residential lines.52 By 1954, the 
Indianapolis system was in the throes of nineteenth and twentieth 
. 
century de jure segregation and could well have been one of the test 
cases in Brown I. 
The other crucial date in the litigation, as in most desegregation 
cases,53 was the time of trial in 1968. Between 1954 and 1968, the In-
dianapolis school board's policies tended to maintain the dual nature 
• 
of the 1954 system as well as create new segregative conditions. As 
racially identifiable neighborhoods grew, the school board added 
new schools or enlarged existing schools in line with the racial com-
position of the neighborhood.54 Thus, racially identifiable schools 
were created and perpetuated. Other segregative actions by the 
school board included using optional attendance zones,55 busing 
' 
students to same-race schools when other schools were closer,56 and 
changing attendance boundaries approximately 350 times, with ninety 
p_ercent of those changes furthering segregation.57 The board was 
not wholly to blame for the perpetuation of the dual system within 
IPS during this period. The board faced a radically changing racial 
population,58 new low-rent housing projects,59 and lack of cooperation 
by local officials with respect to zoning and use of city land for 
schools.60 However, only the school board,s actions became the initial 
focus of litigation that lasted twelve years. 
C. The Indianapolis Litigation 
In 1968, the United States Department of Justice brought suit in 
the federal district court for the Southern District of Indiana 
against the Indianapolis school board alleging denial of equal protec-
51/d. at 665-66. 
52[ d. 
Mfhe 1979 Supreme Court opinions concerning Columbus, and Dayton, Ohio, give 
less weight to the condition of a school system at the time of trial if de jure segre-
gation existed in 1954 and had not been completely dismantled at the time of trial. See 
text accompanying notes 149-55 infra. 
64332 F. Supp. at 667-69. 
55/d. at 668. 
~/d. at 669. 
57/d. at 670. · 
&8Jd. at 672-73. 
5
'/d. at 673-74. 
00/d. at 67 4. 
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tion of the laws.61 In light of the actions taken by the board both 
before and after Brown I, the trial court had no difficulty inferring 
the necessary segregative intent and holding that the board, acting 
as agent of the state of Indiana, was maintaining a de jure segre-
gated school system at the time of trial.62 The decision upon the 
issue of segregation was quickly rendered credible by its affirmation 
in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the subsequent denial 
of certiorari by the Supreme Court.63 The remed-y suggested in In-
dianapolis I by District Judge Dillin was the real source of con-
troversy: Proper desegregation of the Indianapolis public schools 
would. be best achieved by an interdistrict remedy.64 
-
An interdistrict remedy had rarely been suggested or ordered 
before 1971.65 District Judge Dillin, to test the efficacy of such relief, 
established an interim order for immediately dismantling the dual 
system within the Indianapolis district (IPS) and required the plain-
tiff to secure the joinder of outlying school districts as parties 
defendant to better facilitate the shaping of an interdistrict 
remedy .66 The court's rationale was that desegregation within the 
district itself just would not be effective- "in the long haul, it won't 
work."67 Because 98.5°/o of the black population of the county lived 
within IPS,68 the judge feared that desegregation of only those 
schools would soon result in an undesirable racial balance of forty 
percent minority pupils in the schools, leading to incr,eased "white 
flight."69 Therefore, combining outer, basically white, districts with 
IPS would be the most effective remedial measure. 
. . 
The basis for this preliminary decision was a piece of Indiana 
legislation passed in 1968, which prevented the growth of the IPS 
district into predominantly white residential areas. The General 
11/d. at 656. The Justice Department is empowered to bring an action under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in school desegre.gation cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a), (b) (1976). 
82332 F. Supp. at 677-78. 
03See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81, 88 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). See generally Marsh. The Indianapolis Experience: The 
Anatomy of a Desegregation Case, 9 IND. L. REV. 897, 932~33 (1976). 
84332 F. Supp. 680-81. 
65An interdistrict remedy had been ordered the year before in Arkansas when a 
white district was forced to annex a smaller black district because the boundaries had 
been drawn with the intent to segregate. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ .• 429 F.2d 364 
(8th Cir. 1970). 
68332 F. Supp. at 679-81. 
67/d. at 678. 
GSJd. at 663. 
89/d. at 676. Judge Dillin believed that a 40°/o tipping factor would create an iden· 
tifiably black district rather than just a dual system. ld. 
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Assembly's action, informally entitled "Uni-Gov ,"70 allowed govern-
mental reorganization in Indiana counties having first-class cities.71 
Indianapolis, being the state's only first-class city, was consolidated 
with most of the other civil governments in Marion County72 in 
order to have a larger pool of resources for metropolitan planning 
and problem-solving.73 In Indiana, the boundaries of any school 
system were traditionally and statutorily coterminous with any an-
nexations to the civil city.74 However, two weeks before Uni-Gov 
was approved, the legislature repealed the part of the statute pro-
viding for the expansion of school district lines in first-class cities.75 
Thus, IPS remained frozen with the old city boundaries and could 
not expand to include those outer districts which were, by 1968, 
becoming identifiably white.76 The principal controversy after the 
Supreme Court refused to hear Indianapolis I was the legality of the 
interdistrict remedy which was necessary to overcome the impact of 
Uni-Gov. 
Indianapolis //77 and Indianapolis Il/ 18 included the outlying 
school districts within and without Marion County as added defend-
ants. The district court confirmed its choice of remedy by finding 
that an Indianapolis-only plan would be unsatisfactory .79 Further, 
although the outlying districts had every right to resist school 
reorganization into one metropolitan system, they were nevertheless 
required to comply with an interdistrict remedy because the frozen 
IPS boundary lines made desegregation within the district virtually 
impossible.80 District Judge Dillin then granted interim relief from 
busing blacks out of IPS in order to afford the legislature time to 
-
7
°Consolidated First-Class Cities and Counties Act, ch. 173, 1969 Ind. Acts 357 
(codified at IND. CoDE §§ 18-4-1-1 to -5-4 (Supp. 1980)). 
71Dortch v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 560, 266 N .E.2d 25, 35 (1971). In this case, the In-
diana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. See generally 41 IND. 
L.J. 101 (1971). 
72Beech Grove, Lawrence and Speedway were officially excluded for most pur-
poses except for the right to vote in Indianapolis elections. Indianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. 
at 676 n.93. 
13See 47 IND. L.J. 101. 102 (1971). 
74Act of Mar. 9, 1931, ch. 94, § I. 1931 Ind. Acts 291. 
75IND. CoDE §§ 20-3-14-1 to -11 (1976). In these sections, Acl of Mar. 6, 1961, ch. 
186, 1961 Ind. Acts 101 was amended by Act of Feb. 25, 1969, ch. 52, 1969 Ind. Acts 57. 
76See 332 F. Supp. at 663. 
77368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973). 
78368 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Ind. 1973), rev 'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded, 503 
F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). 
79Indianapolis II, 368 F. Supp. at 1198. 
80/d. at 1203-04. By 1973, the date of Indianapolis II and III, IPS was already 
41.1 Ofo black, indicating to Judge Dillin that perhaps the tipping point in the city was 
much lower than he had originally believed. Jd. at 1198. 
• 
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formulate some kind of permanent plan to effect school desegrega-
tion in Marion County .81 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the lower court's decision with respect to districts 
outside Uni-Gov boundaries and remanded the rest of the case82 for 
reconsideration in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Milliken v. Bradley.83 
In Milliken, the Court reversed an interdistrict metropolitan 
remedy in Detroit and demanded that an interdistrict constitutional 
violation be shown before such relief could be granted. "Specifically, 
it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or 
local school districts, or of a single school district have been a 
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation .... [W]ithout an inter-
district violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional 
wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."84 Therefore, on remand of 
the Indianapolis case, the district court was required to find not only 
segregative effect but also an actual constitutional violation causing 
that condition. 
In the 1975 district court decision in Indianapolis /V,85 the Hous-
ing Authority of the City of Indianapolis (HACI) was an added 
defendant. The agency had been joined because all low-rent housing 
projects built under its auspices were within the IPS boundaries 
although it had the authority to build within five miles of the city 
limits.86 Further evidence was heard on "the effect ... of housing 
and zoning laws, rules, regulations and customs in Marion County, 
Indiana and its various political subdivisions upon the de jure 
segregation of IPS."87 Ultimately, Judge Dillin held that a limited in-
terdistrict remedy88 was warranted by the additional evidence and 
81/d. at 1208. The court outlined possible alternatives available t.o the legislature 
in its Indianapolis Ill supplemental memorandum. Indianapolis ///, 368 F. Supp. 1223. 
82503 F.2d 68, 86 (7th Cir. 1974). 
83418 u.s. 717 (1974). 
84/d. at 7 45. 
85419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975). 
86/d. at 182. 
81/d. This evidence was heard in accordance with Justice Stewart's concurring opin~ 
ion in Milliken: 
Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed t.o the 
separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines, ... (hy I 
transfer of school units between districts, ... or by purposeful. racially 
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for 
transfer of pupils across district lines or for rest ruct.uring of district lines 
might well be appropriate. 
418 U.S. at 755. 
88/ndianapolis IV, 419 F. Supp. at 183. The remedy was limited to transferring 
black students out of IPS. The Indiana legislature by that time had passed a law that 
accommodated such a remedy with the transferor district paying the t.ransf(~r .. ~P 
districts for tuition. IND. ConE §§ 20·8.1-6.5-1 to -10 (1976). _ 
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the "violation, of Uni-Gov, and he enjoined HACI from locating any 
more housing within IPS boundaries.89 This decision satisfied the 
' 
court of appeals. The Supreme Court, however, caught in a revolu-
tion of the law of equal protection, vacated and remanded the case 
for reconsideration in light of two then recent decisions concerning 
discriminatory intent.90 
IV. THE INDIANAPOLIS REMEDY AND SEGREGATIVE INTENT 
The Supreme Court referred the lower courts to the equal pro-
tection cases of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp. 91 and Washington v. Davis.92 Neither of these 
cases deal with school desegregation,93 but both were important with 
respect to the determination of segregative intent. 
In view of Arlington Heights and Davis, the discriminatory in-
tent in IPS's practices and the disproportionate impact of Uni-Gov 
and HACI actions could not support an interdistrict remedy without 
a showing of a purposeful interdistrict violation.94 In Indianapolis 
V,95 therefore, the district court was required to look for segregative 
89419 F. Supp. at 183. 186. 
The eviden·ce in the record, as taken in all hearings, clearly shows that 
the suburban Marion County units of government, including the added 
defendant school corporations. have consistently resisted the movement of 
black citizens or black pupils into their territory. They have resisted school 
consolidation. they resisted civil annexation so long as civil annexation car-
ried school annexation with it, they ceased resisting civil annexation only 
when the Uni-Gov Act made it. clear that. the schools would not be involved. 
Suburban Marion Count.y has r esisted the erection of public housing projects 
out.side IPS territory. suburban Marion County officials have refused to 
cooperate with HUD on t.he location of such projects, and the customs and 
usages of hot h th~ officials and inhabitants of such areas has been t.o 
discourage blacks from ~t~eking to purchase or rent homes there in .... 
/d. at 182-83. 
~11/rulianapolis IV. !141 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Bowen v. lJ nit.ed StatPs, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). Circuit. 
Judge Tont ... 's disspnt in t ht. ... court of appeals opinion foreshadowed the subsequent 
Supreme Court dt\cision. !141 F.2d at 1224. , 
~ 1 429 u.s. 252 ( 1977). 
!l:!426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
~: 1A rlington Heights involvPd a claim of residential 1.oning discrimination. In 
Washington v. Davis, t h~ plaintiffs alleged discrimination in the hiring practices of the 
w a.shingt on . n.c. ml't ropolit an police depart mt ... nt. 
~· ·' The school des<~grcgat.ion cases have . .. adhered to the basic equal 
prntt.•ct ion principiP that t ht.~ inviciious qualit.y of a law claimed t.o be racially 
diseriminatory must ultimately ht\ traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
post .... That t hPrt. ... are hot h prt~dominant.ly hlack and predominant.ly white 
school~ in a <~ommunit.v is not alone violative of t.he Equal Protection Clause. 
Washington v. Oavis, 426 U.S. al 240 (1976). 
~~456 F. Su pp. 18:3 (S.D. Inrl. 1978). 
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intent in those acts which tended to prevent effective metropolitan 
desegregation. The court did not have to find that segregative in-
tent was the sole motivation for the acts- the existence of any 
segregative intent would support an interdistrict remedy.96 
The court's burden was further lessened because there was no 
need to find that the outer districts had intentionally contributed to 
or caused the IPS school segregation. This requirement, established 
by the Court in Milliken,91 was obviated by the Indiana General 
Assembly which had provided an interdistrict transfer remedy that 
could be imposed without culpability of the transferee districts .. 98 
Thus, Indianapolis V dealt exclusively with finding segregative in-
tent in Uni-Gov and HACI actions. 
There were neither facially discriminatory statutes nor express 
statements of racial purpose present so the district court examined 
Uni-Gov and HACI using methods by which intent could be inferred. 
The court began its inquiry by examining the disproportionate im-
pact of both forces.99 It reasoned: 
"The impact of the official action- whether it 'bears more. 
heavily on one race than another,' ... -may provide an im· 
portant starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unex-
plainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the eJfect 
of the state action even when the governing legislation ap-
pears neutral on its face .... " 100 
After looking at impact? the trial court~ using criteria suggested 
in Arlington Heights, examined the passage of Uni·Gov for evidence 
of a segregative purpose.101 This standard generally guides a court in 
" [A plaintiff is not required) to prove that the· challenged action rested 
solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legis-
lature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a deci-
sion motivated solely by a single concern. or even that a particular purpose 
was the ''dominant'· or "primary., one~ 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265 (footnote 
omitted). 
e1Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 745. In Milliken, the Court stated that a eon· 
stitutional violation could be proven either by discriminatory acts in one district -caus-
ing segregation in an adjacent district or by racially identifiable district lines drawn by 
the state. /d. 
88lndianapalis V. 456 F. Supp. at 190-91. The statute provides that pupil transfers 
. . 
can be effectuated if: (l) the transferor corporation has violated equal protection, (2t a 
unitary system cannot be implemented within the offending eorporation, and (3) the 
court is compelled to order such transfers under the fourteenth amendm·ent. IND. CoDE 
§ 20-8.1-6.5-1 (1976). 
"456 F. Supp. at 185. 
100/d. (quoting 429 U~S. at 26.6). 
'
0
'The Arlington Heights case suggests that, besides impact, five other factors 
could be relevant to inferring intent: (1) the historical background of the decision, 
• 
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considering the "totality of the relevant facts" 102 from which it can 
glean an inference of intent. In the instance of Uni-Gov, there was 
convincing evidence that segregation had been a factor in the deci· 
sion to freeze the IPS boundaries. First, the court recounted the 
history of white-black relations in Indiana as well as that of In-
dianapolis' dual school system. 103 It then considered the sequence of 
events leading to the adoption of the Uni-Gov act and emphasized 
that the partial repeal of the statute allowing expansion of school 
boundaries occurred just prior to passage of U ni-Gov .. 104 Moreover t 
the court heard testimony to the effect that the act would not have 
been passed if IPS were to grow with the e-ity. 105 Next, District 
Judge Dillin examined substantive departures from prior policy. The 
legislature had been eliminating remnants of racially discriminatory 
laws since 1949 when it appeared to reverse that progress by 
repealing the pertinent section of the annexation statute.106 From 
this pattern of behavior, the district court found that Uni-Gov was 
passed, at least in part, with the purpose of maintaining interdistrict 
school segregation.107 
The court found segregative intent in the actions of HACI in a 
different manner. Using a test employed by the Sixth Circuit 108 and 
other courts of appeals, District Judge Dillin held that a presump-
tion of segregative intent was raised because the "natural, probable 
and foreseeable result of erecting public housing projects wholly 
within IPS territory would be to concentrate poor blacks in such 
projects and thus to increase or perpetuate public school segrega-
tion within IPS."109 HACI failed to affirmatively establish that its 
policies were racially neutral, and it too was found to have commit-
ted an int'erdistrict constitutional violation.110 
To remedy these intentional violations, the district court enjoined 
HACI from further building within IPS and reinstated its 1975 
order to transfer a certain percentage of blacks from IPS to the 
(2) any .. specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision/' (3) substan-
tive departures in policy, (4) departures from usual procedure, and (5) any administra-
tive or legislative history. 429 U.S. at 267-68. 
102Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
103456 F. Supp. at 186-87. 
104/d. at 187. 
105/d. This testimony was given by then-Mayor Richard Lugar. 
106/d. at 188. 
101Jd. 
108See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ .• 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 997 (1977); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied. 421 U.S. 963 (1975) . 
.. 
09456 F. Supp. at 189. 
1t0Jd. 
1981] INTERDISTRICT BUSING 813 
outlying districts within Uni-Gov's boundaries (the county Jines). 111 
The court determined the number of pupils to be transferred by 
calculating approximately how many children would have gone to 
schools in outlying districts absent the HACI violation.112 
Except with respect to two districts within Uni-Gov limits,113 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's order 114 
by holding that the interdistrict remedy was justified because of the 
violations by both Uni-Gov and HACI. 115 The court also stated that 
the form of the order was proper in light of the "specific incre-
mental effects" of HACI's actions. 116 The court of appeals emphasized 
that even though there would be some difficulty determining the ex-
act segregative effects attributable to Uni-Gov alone, a remedy 
could have been ordered commensurate with the impact! 17 The opin-
ion further indicated that the lower court had the power, if 
necessary, to transfer students from outlying districts into IPS 
because the state action had had interdistrict effects. 118 Whethe.r 
these measures will be implemented is difficult to determine. 
Nonetheless, the district court's order was deemed effective on Oc· 
tobe.r 6, 1980, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 119 
V. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND SEGREGATIVE INTENT 
A. Generally 
The various dispositions of the lndi~napolis case demonstrate 
the difficulty inherent in finding segregative intent in desegregation 
cases. In accordance with Keyes, segregative intent must be found 
in order to establish a constitutional violation!2° Courts have had little 
' 
difficulty discovering segregative intent in the South because of 
11
'/d. at. 191. 
uz/d. at 190. This approach had recently been approved by the Supreme Court in 
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). The Court remanded the case to 
the qistrict court to limit the desegregation remedy to effect the school distribution 
that would have been present without the constitutional violation. ld. at 420·21. 
113'fhe Beech Grove and Speedway judgments were vacated and remanded to 
determine whether HACI had jurisdiction to operate in those locales. United States v. 
Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 114, 
115 (1980). 
114/d. at 1117. 
n5Jd. at 1111. 
u'Jd. at 1112-14. 
111/d. at 1113. 
118/d. at 1115. 
119Bowen v. Buckley, 101 S. Ct. 114 (1980). 
120See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra. 
• 
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numerous facially discriminatory actions. 121 To date, however, the 
Court has not explained how lower courts in northern cases are to 
find segregative intent absent such actions. Instead, the Court 
refers them to non-school cases such as Arlington Heights 122 (hous-
ing/zoning) and Washington v. Davis 123 (employment). Thus, lower 
tribunals are left to their own devices in finding purposeful segrega-. 
tion in school cases. 
Another reason courts have experienced difficulty finding 
segregative intent in school cases is that the case law is still evolv-
ing. The body of decisions regarding this requirement is growing 
but is by no means creating a logical pattern. 
1. Methods of Finding Intent.- Courts and commentators 
generally discern two separate approaches for finding segregative 
intent: the subjective method and the objective method. However, 
these labels are actually misnomers. The categories are better named 
for the type of evidence used by the courts in finding segregative in-
tent: direct evidence and indirect evidence. 
The purported subjective approach for finding discriminatory in-
tent involves the examination of the "subjective" motivation of the 
officials promulgating the actions.124 Intent is established under this 
theory by means of direct evidence of discriminatory motives. Such 
evidence includes facially discriminatory statutes and overt expres-
sions of racial motivation made by the persons involved in the 
decision-making.' 25 However, it is highly unlikely that there actually 
is a test for subjective motivation; segregative intent is subjective 
motivation.. Facially segregative actions are automatically un-
constitutional because segregation is not a proper legislative goal. 
When the motivation is not readily apparent, however, other factors 
have to be entered into evidence from which an actor's subjective 
motivation, or intent, can be inferred.126 Courts then use indirect in-
dicia of intent which can be used as evidence of motivation. 
. . . ' 
121See generally text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra. 
122429 u.s. 252 (1977). . 
123426 u.s. 22,9 (1976). 
124See Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williams-
burgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 725, 733 (1977); Note, R-eading the Mind of the 
School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 
317, 321 (1976). 
125Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 197 4), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 
(1975) (pattern of segregative action included ustatements of express intention not to 
counter anti-integration sentiment"). 
1280ne court has expressly stated this concept. "[W)e treat the District Court's 
finding of a lack of racial motivation as irrelevant in the face of his findings of foresC(!· 
able effect [based on objective evidence]." Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ . , 512 
F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975). 
• 
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Indirect evidence of segregative intent includes such acts as gerry-
mandered boundary lines and free transfer systems. These acts can be 
motivated by legitimate objective educational reasons as well as by 
covert segregative intent, hence the term "objective" approach. 
However, when direct evidence of discrimination is not available, 
courts must rely on this indirect evidence to infer segregative in-
tent. Thus, it is apparent that courts do not rely on subjective or ob-
jective approaches to find segregative intent. Rather, they rely upon 
the two types of evidence these approaches are based on. 
Finding intent from indirect evidence is the most commonly used 
approach in northern desegregation cases.127 This method has given 
rise to several so-called .. objective" tests and is, for that reason, the 
more successful procedure for finding segregative purpose in widely 
differing fact situations. The analysis using indirect evidence has 
been called "objective intent," 128 "institutional intent,"129 the "fore-
seeability test,"130 "cumulative violation,"131 "the Omaha presump-
tion,"132 and even "totality of the facts" test!33 Regardless of the 
name appended to it, the approach is essentially the same: The court 
looks at what was done, how it was done, and who was affected. 
One of the indirect analyses that has been used successfully is 
whether segregation or maintenance of existing segregation was a 
natural, foreseeable result of the official action.134 Another ·of the 
more comprehensive indirect analyses is for a court to look at pat-
terns of official conduct, such as drawing school attendance lines 
that maintain or increase segregation 135 or planning school construc-
tion.136 Such patterns are not mutually exclusive, and many practices 
that tend to segregate are often combined and viewed as a whole. 
For such a case, the decision in Washington v. Davis 131 suggests that 
"an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the 
127See, e.g., cases cited notes 134-36 & 141 infra. 
128See Note, supra note 124, at 328. 
129/d. at 334. 
130See Comment, supra note 124, at 732. 
141/d. at 734. 
132/d. at 735. 
133Note, Finding Intent in School Segregation Constitutional Violations, 28 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 119, 162 (1977). 
134N AACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F .2d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir .), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 997 (1977); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. School Dist. #21, 512 
F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
1~Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, 351 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. 
Minn. 1972). 
138M organ v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d at 592-93. 
137426 u.s. 229 (1976) . 
• 
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totality of the relevant facts." 138 Similarly, a court can find that a 
school board was motivated, at least in part, by a segregative pur-
pose by looking for "institutional intent." This route is very much 
like the one used in Arlington Heights 139 and Indianapolis V except 
that the court looks solely at the acts of the school board and at 
whether a less segregative alternative is available absent a strong 
educational justification for the choice made.140 The various tests 
also subsume a method known as "the Omaha presumption" in 
which a presumption of intent arises when official acts or omissions 
have created a foreseeably segregative condition. The presumption 
may only be rebutted if the defendant board can establish that dis-
criminatory intent was not a motivating factor .141 Though this 
method was used in Indianapolis V for the HACI offense, the 
Supreme ·court questioned the validity of this presumption in 
1979.142 It appears, therefore, that the prior success of this test is 
probably attributable to the weight of the indirect evidence. 
Although each test has distinctive features, they are virtually 
interchangeable and often not clearly distinguishable. Rather than 
searching for the "best" method or waiting for the Supreme Court 
to select one, courts have required plaintiffs to bring forth as much 
evidence as possible that appears to indicate segregation. The 
courts have then judged that evidence by whatever method suits 
their tastes or as equitably as possible. Generally, school boards 
which have engaged in a great number of suspect acts will be re-
quired to dismantle the effects of those acts .. Fewer and unconnected 
actions will usually not require a remeay because they are often ex· 
plainable by de facto conditions. Whatever approach is used, the 
Supreme Court has usually demonstrated its amenability to the ap-
proach by denying certiorari. 143 
'
38/d. at 242. 
'
39See note 101 supra. 
'•
0See Note, supra note 124, at 334-35. 
141United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535~36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 946 (1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See generally Note, Intent to Segregate: The Omaha 
Presumption, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775 (1976); Comment, supra note 124, at 735. 
uzReferring to the Sixth Circuit's emphasis upon Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of 
Educ .• the Court said: 
We have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segre-
gative consequences makes out a prima facie case of purposeful racial dis-
crimination and shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendants if 
they are to escape judgment; and even more clearly there is no warrant in 
our cases for holding that such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of 
persuasion to the defendants. 
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman. 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979). 
'
43See cases cited notes 125, 134 & 171. 
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2. Recent Trends in the Supreme Court. -The Court's tacit ap-
proval speaks well of the lower courts' treatment of such a sensitive 
issue, but it also indicates wise restraint from establishing any one 
standard as the rule. Because of the great disparity in the history, 
school organization, disputed official acts, and other facts relevant to 
each case, a single rule would be virtually impossible to formulate. 
The Court's restraint is even more apparent when one considers 
some of the decisions from the Fifth Circuit. Because it is situated in 
the South, this particular court of appeals has had to deal with 
numerous school desegregation cases.144 The constitutional issue, as 
that court views it, does not necessarily depend upon the de jure/de 
facto distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Keyes. The court 
in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District 145 stated 
that "while [discriminatory motive and purpose] may reinforce a find-
ing of effective segregation, [they] are not necessary ingredients of 
constitutional violations in the field of public education. We ... hold 
that the racial and ethnic segregation that exists ... is unconstitu-
tional- not de facto, nor de jure, but unconstitutional." 146 
The Keyes decision, requiring intent, would seem to preclude 
reliance on Cisneros. However, the Court declined to hear Cisneros 
four days after the decision in Keyes was handed down. Commen-
tators•" and at least two Justices 148 have suggested either that the 
de jure/de facto distinction has no merit or that de facto segregation 
should be dismantled also. Generally, their arguments are the same: 
Segregation is just as harmful whether it is de facto or de jure. 
Although the Supreme Court has never espoused the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach, two recent cases have diminished the significance of 
the de jure/de facto distinction to some extent. In Columbus Board 
of Education v. Penick149 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brink-
man (Dayton //)(50 the Court in essence ruled that if racially iden· 
tifiable schools existed in 1954 and still exist at time of trial, the 
school board has failed in its affirmative duty to dismantle the dual 
a•see generally F. READ & L. McGouGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL IN-
TEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH xii, 565-72 (1978). 
145467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). 
146/d. at 149. . 
. . 
141See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); 40 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 10; Note, De Facto 
School Segregation and the "Sta.te Action" Requirement: A Suggested NeuJ Ap-
proach, 48 IND. L.J. 304 (1973). 
148ln Keyes, both Justices Powell and Douglas decried the use of t.he distinction 
because it did not ameliorate segregation caused by a neighborhood school policy 
where there was private housing discrimination. 413 U.S. at 214-53. 
149443 u.s. 449 (1979). 
150443 u.s. 526 (1979). 
• 
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system, and an appropriate remedy must be imposed.151 The deter-
mination of present intent in the Columbus and Dayton districts was 
based upon the foreseeable consequences and impact of official ac-
tions which showed that the, boards were perpetuating past 
segregative practices rather than eliminating them.i52 This method 
of :finding present intent was approved as early as 1973, in Keyes, 
when the Court stated that: 
a connection between past segregative acts and present 
segregation may be prese·nt even when not apparent .... In-
tentional school segregation in the past may have been a fac-
tor in creating a natural environment for the growth of fur-
ther segregation. Thus, if respondent School Board cannot 
disprove segregative intent,. it can rebut the prima facie case 
only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create 
or contribute to the current segregated condition ... }53 
The approach in Columbus and Dayton II is best described in a re-
cent review: · 
The approach to ... school desegregation that the Su-
preme Court endorses ... has four elements: first, the exist-
ence of identifiably black schools in the school system in 
1954[;] ... [s]econd, a legal determination that the existence 
of such schools in 1954 ... [created] a continuing constitu-
tional duty to eliminate identifiably black schools[;] . . . 
[t]hird, an intensive and detailed examination of school 
system actions since 1954 in order to determine whether the 
school system has taken all feasible actions to eliminate the 
identifiably black schools[;] ... [f]ourth, the conclusion that 
the only way to eliminate the identifiably black character of 
some schools is to modify· the neighborhood school policy 
through appropriate racial transfers ... so that no school 
has a distinctly black enrollment .... 154 
The Court's current view. then, is that when a district combines 
the vestiges of a 1954 de jure situation with actions which have the 
foreseeable consequence of disparate racial impact, the system has 
not been effectively dismantled. The Court may have "accepted" any 
mode Qf finding intent so long as a lower court's decision was not 
clearly erroneous, but its focus since Brown I has been primarily 
151443 U.S. at 461: 443 U.S. at 541. 
152443 U.S. at 464; 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. 
15a413 U.S. at 211. 
• 
154Kitch, The Return of Color·Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, 
and Columbus. 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2-3 (1980) . 
• 
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upon a school board's affirmative duty to dismantle a dual system 
rather than the board's purpose in maintaining it. 155 
It is with reference to this attitude that the Indianapolis inter-
district remedy can be understood. Circuit Judge Tone's 1979 dis-
• 
sent in Indian.apolis V is probably more correct than the majority's 
rationale when he states that "today's decision cannot, I think, be 
reconciled with .the distinction between de jure and de facto segre-
gation."158 The Court's current trend away from the importance of 
the de jure/de facto distinction explains part of the reason why the 
Indianapolis remedy was not overturned. The Court's disposition of 
the Indianapolis case is further understood when one considers 
other interdistrict cases. 
B. Interdistrict Remedies 
. 
1. Interdistrict Remedy and Segregative Intent. -Milliken v. 
Bradley157 is the first and essentially the only opinion by the 
Supreme Court on the interdistrict remedy and public schools. 
According to Milliken, plaintiffs must show an interdistrict violation 
• 
with an interdistrict effect in order to obtain such a remedy!58 
Typically, intentional acts of an adjacent school district or racially 
drawn district lines constitute such a violation and elicit the 
necessary effect.169 In Milliken, the Court could find neither type of 
violation.180 Detroit, therefore, had to dismantle its own de jure 
system, but as a district it remained identifiably black.161 
Many courts have tried to avoid this result, especially in the 
North where urban areas have a great concentration of minorities. 
Their cure for the problem has often been to initially suggest, and 
even order, interdistrict relief as soon as they find that the "city" 
district is operating a dual system. The interdistrict actions found to 
support the remedy generally fall into one, if not both, of the 
Milliken categories-district actions or legislative redistricting. 
'
51Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. at 220-21 (Powell. J .• concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39. 41 (1971): Swann v. 
Charlotte· Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971);. Green v. County School Bd., 
391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (uSchool Boards such as the respondent then [1954] 
operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the af· 
firmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary 
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch ."). 
••Indianapolis V. 637 F.2d at 1130. 
117418 u.s. 717 (1974) • 
• ., /d. at 7 44-45. 
••Jd. at 7 45. See text accompanying note 84 supra. 
110418 U.S. at 748. 
•••JtL at 759. 
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There is also the occasional anomaly, as in Indianapolis, in which 
housing is deemed to create an interdistrict effect. However,, for a 
court to order any interdistrict remedy, it must find the inter-
district act violative .. That is, the act must be accompanied by 
segregative intent. 
Segregative intent, as well as an interdistrict act, were missing 
in Milliken. As in the intradistrict cases, however, the Court failed 
to elucidate the standards a court is to use to determine segregative 
intent. Thus, courts are left with the same direct and indirect 
methods used in finding intradistrict violations. In some cases, these 
methods are appropriate; in others, their use seems less reliable, if 
they are actually used at all. 
2. Interdistrict Violations by School Districts.- The easiest in-
terdistrict violations to ascertain are those that are blatantly, if not 
expressly, segregative in purpose. The inte·rdistrict order in Louis-
ville162 was designed to remedy just such practices. The Louisville 
district was one of three school districts in Jefferson County, two of 
which were operating state-mandated dual systems at the time of 
trial.163 Before Brown I, the two latter districts had actively engaged 
in segregative practices by disregarding boundary lines and 
transferring blacks into an inner city school for blacks because the 
county system had no such school.164 The lines were also ignored 
when one high school. belonging to the Louisville district, was built 
within another district's system, and white students from both 
districts attended it.165 In an action for interdistrict relief, the court 
held that prior disregard for district lines "for the purpose and with 
the actual effect of segre,gating school children among the public 
schools of the county on the basis of race" required an interdistrict 
remedy.166 
School boards have been involved in other more ingenious 
methods of segregation, some of which did not require courts to infer 
intent. ln Lee v. Macon County Board of Educ(ttion 161 and Wright v. 
Council of Emporia,168 boards attempted to secede from county-wide 
182Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). 
103510 F .2d at 1359·60. 
184/d. at 1360. 
16!iJd. 
188/d. at 1361. The court also believed the remedy appropriate because the school 
boundaries and city limits of Louisville were not coterminous, and the presence of 
almost 10,000 children. mostly white. between the two lines ~ggravated the problem. 
/d. 
u'7448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971). 
188407 U.S~ 451 (1972). 
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desegregation plans. In each case, the court focused upon the 
adverse effects of the action which would ultimately have created an 
interdistrict violation if allowed to attain fruition!69 As stated by the 
court in Lee, "'fhe city cannot secede from the county where the ef-
fect- to say nothing of the purpose- of the secession has a subs tan-
tial adverse effect on the desegregation of the county school 
distriet." 170 The violation was actually prevented in both of these 
cases, but their precedential value is in their analyses. The courts' 
relative indifference to the element of intent in these cases explains, 
to a certain extent, the acceptability of decisions in which legisla-
tures were involved. Courts have-often looked to the segregative effect 
as of utmost importance, with segregative. purpose as a secondary con-
. . 
sideration. 
9. Interdistrict Violations by State Legislatures.- Several in-
terdistrict violations have been found and corrected within the se· 
cond Milliken category in which the state legislature or the state 
school board, rather than the local school district, has promulgated a 
violative policy or statute. Violations of this nature usually involve 
the drawing or redrawing of district lines, but the manner of finding 
intent sometimes differs. 
The Eighth Circuit has been particularly active in correcting 
segregation flowing from legislative actions. In Haney v~ County 
Board of Education,tn a 1970 Arkansas case, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ordered the annexation of a black sc-hool district to 
a larger, more populous, white district in order to achieve a "unitary 
non·racial school system."172 A prior opinion in the litigation justified 
the remedy in this fashion: Because the state of Arkansas had re-
quired separate schools for blacks and whites,173 school district lines 
drawn for school reorganization had racial contours and were 
violative as a matter of law because they were a reflection of that 
earlier policy .174 
Five years later, in United States v. Mis_souri, 175 the Eighth Cir-
cuit again ordered annexation of a racially identifiable school 
district.176 The district in question had been separated from the 
u19448 F.2d at 752': 407 U.S. at 462. 
110448 F.2d at 752. 
111429 F .2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970). 
112/d. at 369~ 
173Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 4.10 F~2d 920~ 923-24 (8th Cir. 1969). 
114/d. at 926. The school districts were not required to be distinctly separate, ~'[b]ut 
the fact that the variou$ reorganized districts in Sevier County reflect a bi";racial 
system of education by district Jines must be accepted as more than mere coincidence." 
/d. at 924. 
115515 F .2d 1365 (8th Cir .), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975). 
176515 F.2d at 1373. 
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other adjacent districts in 1937 and had been excluded ever since 
from reorganization plans formulated by the county and state.177 The 
court ordered its annexation with two adjoining districts on the 
basis of intent as found in Keyes. and later in Columbus and Dayton 
//:178 "Intentional school segregation in the past may not be ignored 
in assessing the impact of present inaction which has the effect of 
maintaining segregation." 179 
Very recently. another Arkansas case was decided which involved 
a fact situation similar to that in Haney- district lines were drawn 
as a reflection of the same statute. But in Morrilton School District 
No. 92 v. United States, 180 rather than finding purpose as a matter of 
law the court of appeals followed much the same reasoning as was 
used in United States v. Missouri. It found that the impact of the 
discriminatory statute was still being felt; 181 therefore, sufficient in-
tent was present to justify an interdistrict remedy to eliminate all 
vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 182 
• 
An interesting and distinctively northern case in which both the 
school board and legislature created the need for an interdistrict 
remedy is Evans v. Buchanan.183 That case dealt with the school 
segregation situation within and without Wilmington, Delaware. 
Delaware, at one time, had state-imposed segregation!84 Even 
after Brown /, New Castle County schools were involved in a 
transfer system across district lines185 which, as in Louisville, 
established a certain amount of interdependence among the dis-
tricts. For many years, the only high school in the county that would 
• 
accept black students was in Wilmington itself. Consequently, cross-
district transportation of blacks was required.186 Also, the district 
court in Evans found that various governmental authorities had con-
tributed to the racial disparity between the city and the rest of the 
. 
county, 187 in much the same manner the district court in Indianapolis 
117Id. at 1370. 
118See text accompanying notes 149-55 supra. 
179515 F.2d at 1370. 
180606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). 
181606 F .2d at 225-26. 
182/d. at 228-29. 
183393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). The litigation began as one 
of the companion cases in Brown .I under the designation, Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. 
Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (1952). Because there have been so many reported opinions, this 
Note will confine itself to the district court opinions which found the constitutional 
violation to require interdistrict relief and which granted the remedy. 
184393 F. Supp. at 432. 
185/d. at 433. 
188Id. 
• 
187/d. at 438. This action helped create a situation whereby 75°.4l of the county's 
black students attended school in Wilmington. ld. at 439. 
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IV had found HACI actions segregative.188 These violations included 
acts by the New Castle County Housing Authority189 and discrimina-
tion in the private housing market sanctioned by state officials until 
1968!90 One of the more decisive factors in the Wilmington case, 
however, was the passage of the Education Advancement Act of 
1968.191 This Act provided for school reorganization throughout the 
state with the exception of Wilmington. The Act also included fac-
tors to be considered when reorganizing but failed to include any 
criterion for reorganization on the basis of race. Therefore, the court 
held that the statute created a suspect racial classification 192 which 
contributed to segregation by maintaining district lines on the basis 
of race.193 
In addition to the segregative cross-district transactions, the 
court inferred seg.regative intent from the impact of all the other 
more "neutral" actions.194 On the basis of these violations, the court 
declared pertinent provisions of the legislative act .. nonconstitu-
tional"195 and, a year later, ordered the consolidation of most of the 
county's school districts.196 
From these representative cases, it is evident that determining 
intent when considering an interdistrict remedy is a much less 
strenuous task once intradistrict de jure segregation has been 
• 
found. A court's emphasis is upon the additional segregative impact 
of the official actions rather than upon the purpose for which they 
were formulated. Attributing such importance to impact is consis-
tent with the renewed Supreme Court attitude that the affirmative 
duty to dismantle de jure segregation will not allow any hindrance 
or inaction to stop its full fruition. The Indianapolis case came at the 
right time and involved the right type of violation. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE INDIANAPOLIS CASE 
A. Non-Educational Violations 
The Indianapolis litigation has one component present in few 
other cases: the state actions which affected school desegregation 
were only tangentially concerned with education. 
188See note 87 supra and accompanying text. 
18i393 F. Supp. at 435. 
190/d. at 434. 
lln56 Del. Laws, ch. 292, § 6 (1968) (current version at DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 
1001 to 1005 (Supp. 1980)). 
192393 F. Supp. at 442. 
193/d. at 445-46. 
19
./d. at 438, 442-43. 
''
5/d. at 447. 
198Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328. 353 (D. Del. 1976). 
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The two factors purporting to cause interdistrict segregation in 
the schools- Uni-Gov and HACI-did not have the educational em-
phasis that school board actions or legislative redistricting have had. 
The district court could have found a legitimate state purpose for 
the creation of Uni-Gov and could have corrected the housing viola-
tion without taking affirmative action with respect to the schools. 
Metropolitan reorganization and public housing can have a 
distinct impact upon a school system, but their purposes are to af-
fect altogether different aspects of society. If there were a segre-
gative intent involved in these kinds of decisions, their cure would 
eventually eliminate their respective constitutional violations as 
well as school segregation. Cases have arisen which deal with these 
kinds of state actions individually. One case has even demonstrated 
that the issue of school desegregation does not alter the considera-
tion of such a state action on its own merits~J97 
In Higgins v. Board of Education, 198 the Sixth Circuit confronted 
a situation much like the problem encountered with Uni-Gov. The 
reasoning of this case could have been used to justify the propriety 
of maintaining pre-existing school district boundaries within Uni-
Gov. The Michigan legislature passed a senate bill which changed 
prior law by preventing the boundaries of a school district from ex-
panding with civil annexation in second-class cities.t99 Certain 
suburbs of Grand Rapids actively supported and partially financed 
this bill which would affect only Grand Rapids and one other city .200 
Although the question concerning an interdistrict remedy was 
mooted by the fact that Grand Rapids was not operating a 
segregated system, the court of appeals nevertheless determined 
that there was no constitutional violation in the passage of the 
senate bill.201 The bill was justified on the grounds that surburban 
school districts would otherwise lose a substantial portion of their 
tax bases because most of the areas annexed were industrial. and 
the few children affected did not warrant such a loss.202 
The propriety of the boundary problem created by Uni-Gov 
could also have been justified with a more specialized test for intent. 
A focus on legislative intent rather than segregative intent might 
have garnered sufficient governmental justification to overcome the 
'
91See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444 (W.O. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508 
F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974). 
'
98395 F. Supp. 444 (W .D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508 F .2d 779 (6th Cir. 197 4). 
199395 F. Supp. at 473. Senate Bill 1100 was modified to become Act 177 of Public 
Acts of 1962 and is currently found at MICH. COMP. LAws § 380.401 (Supp. 1980-81) 
where it differs in substance because of school reorganization. 
200395 F. Supp. at 473. 
20
'508 F.2d 779, 797 (6th Cir. 1974). 
202395 F. Supp. at 474. 
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suspicion of an illicit discriminatory purpose.203 Metropolitan 
reorganization has importance on its own merit without regard to 
its tangential effect upon schools. 
The other anomaly in the Indianapolis case is the interdistrict 
effect attributed to housing. Hills v. Gautreaux,204 a 1976 Supreme 
Court case, effectuated an interdistrict housing remedy for viola· 
tions by the Chicago .Housing Authority and the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The offense 
was entirely within Chicago's c·ity limits, the only location where the 
two agencies had se.lected sites for public housing205 although they 
had the power to operate within a three-mile radius from the city 
limits.208 The Court determined in Hills that the district court had 
. . . . . . . . . 
authority to force HUD to start selecting sites and assistance out-
side of Chicago, the power to do so already having been conferred 
by law.207 Unlike the schools in Milliken,208 there would be much less 
disturbance of local control because the agencies were not authorized 
to seek locations within other incorporated areas}09 No relief, was 
ordered for those people currently living at the discriminatorily 
selected sites, but -then, unlike the Indianapolis case. the issue of 
school desegregation demanding immediate relief was not involved. 
With HACI's violations, it would have been simple to stop at a hous-
ing remedy which would have effectuated school desegregation 
sooner or laterf. and probably would have been less expensive for 
the school board.210 This consideration, as well as the arguably 
legitimate state purpose for Uni-Gov, had to have created substan· 
tial problems in justifying an interdistrict des·egregation order. At 
least one circuit court judge recognize.d this. 
B. Dissension in the Indianapolis Case 
When reading the 1980 Seventh Circuit opinion of Indianapol_is 
V, one wonders whether the majority and the dissent are speaking 
of the same case. Circuit Judge Tone, whose research into the prob-
lem forc_ed him to change his vote in Indianapolis IV,211 wrote three 
203See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative· Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 131. 
204425 u.s. 284 (1976). 
205/d. at 286. 
200/d. at 298 n.14~ 
207 /d. at 306. 
208418 u .8. 717 (197 4). 
209425 U.S. at 298-99 n.l4. 
• 
21
°Comment, Housing Remedies in School Desegregation Cases: The 
Indianapolis, 12 HARV. C.R.-G.L.L. REV. 649, 687 (1977). 
211541 F.2d at 1224 n.* (Tone, J., dissenting). 
View from 
• 
• 
• 
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strong dissents based specifically on the failure to demonstrate 
segregative purpose.212 His most recent dissent disputes the majority's 
conclusion that the Uni-Gov act and HACI evinced the requisite in-
tent for supporting an interdistrict remedy. 
Judge Tone did not view the Uni-Gov act as fulfilling the Arling-
ton Heights fact~rs as they were used by the majority and the 
• district court. He found no historical background of the act itself 
that showed segregative purpose.213 He also concluded that past re-
jections of proposed consolidation in Marion County were warranted 
by financial reasons and the goal of local school district autonomy .214 
He completed his repudiation of Uni-Gov's role in the controversy 
by pointing out that the repeal of the statute, which had made 
school boundaries coterminous with civil annexation, was un-
necessary because Uni-Gov was not an annexation by the city but 
rather a governmental reorganization imposed by the state.215 
As for HACI, Judge Tone minimized its actual effect by explain-
ing that its function in site selection was limited. Most of the loca-
tions were selected by a "turn-key" method, whereby a private 
developer selects the site and turns the project over to the housing 
authority after it is built.216 The remaining sites were selected by a 
mayoral task force.217 HACI's involvement was therefore de 
• 
minimus. Judge Tone thus bemoaned the majority's reliance upon 
the disparate racial impact of a de facto situation, the only rationale 
he perceived as actually supporting the decision.218 
C. The Indianapolis Case A Result-Oriented Decision? 
Indianapolis V was a case whose time had come. Nine years had 
been spent litigating essentially the same issue, the interdistrict 
remedy. As a newly applicable Supreme Court opinion was handed 
down, the case was returned to the district court. First, there was 
Milliken v. Bradley.219 Then, there were Arlington Heights 220 and 
212/d. at 1224 (Tone, J ., dissenting): 637 F.2d at 1119 (Tone, J .. dissenting): 573 F .2d 
at 415 (Tone, J., dissenting). Judge Tone's dissent in Indianapolis IV warned the court 
of appeals of the deficiency in its decision because it did not include a finding of intent 
as prescribed by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). He further denounced the 
majority's reliance upon a .. 'racial impact',. theory. 541 F.2d at 1227 (Tone, J., dissent-
ing). 
2
'
3/ndianapolis V, 637 F .2d at 1119·20 (Tone, J ., dissenting). 
214/d. at 1121 n.14. This is similar to the rationale accepted in the Higgins case. 
See text accompanying notes 198·202 supra. . 
wr;637 F.2d at 1122 (Tone, J., dissenting). 
21
"'/d. at 1125·26 (Tone, J ., dissenting). 
217/d. at 1126 (Tone, J ., dissenting). 
2
'"/d. at 1129-30 (Tone, J ., dissenting). 
219418 u.s. 717 (1974). 
220429 u.s. 252 (1977). 
I 
I 
1981] INTERDISTRICT BUSING 827 
Washington v. Davis.221 Actually, the most important decisions were 
Columbus 222 and Dayton //,223 two cases which could have con-
siderably eased the burden of finding segregative intent in In-
dianapolis if they had been decided sooner. 
In the Indianapolis V decision, the district court and the court of 
appeals, to a certain degree, contorted a school desegregation case 
to fit into the molds of housing and employment decisions. The 
' 
analyses from these kinds of cases are generally inapplicable in a 
school desegregation case, except that a finding of segregative in-
tent is re.quired and disparate racial impact alone is insufficient. In 
the Indianapolis case, the courts did an excellent, but at times un-
convincing, job. The fault is not theirs; it lies with a lack of 
guidance. And yet, no blame can fairly be laid upon the Supreme 
Court either. School cases differ too much to afford a disc·ernible 
pattern to their offenses and cures. Since Brown I, the Court has ac-
cepted various kinds of "segregative intent'' and has drawn the line 
only when intent cannot be found at all.224 That is why Indianapolis 
IV had to be remanded- no claim of segregative intent had been 
made. And that is why Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights 
were suggested as the ruling authority- not because they in-
structed upon finding intent in the school context but because they 
• 
simply required that segregative intent must be found to create a 
constitutional violation under equal protection. 
There are two explanations of why Indianapolis V was not over-
turned. First, the litigation after Indianapolis I involved essentially 
a remedy case, as opposed to a violation case. Dual level litigation 
involving both violation and remedy stages is not atypical because 
[t]he school desegregation problem usually is divided into the 
violation and the remedy stages. In the first stage, the Court 
seeks to determine whether the school board or another 
' . 
state agency engaged in unconstitutional discrimination; the 
second prescribes the contours of the plan necessary to correct 
the violations. T·he difficulty in the first stage is in going ... to 
the determination that the conduct was intentional or pur-
posive discrimination. 225 
Different considerations are inherent in each phase. In the In-
dianapolis case, the initial violation stage was concluded with a find-
221426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
m443 U.S. 449 (1979}. 
223443 u.s. 526 (1979). 
. 
n•No intent to support an interdistrict remedy was found in Milliken, 418 U.S. at 
745~ ' 
225Lane, The Principles and Politics of Equal Protection: Reflections on Crawford 
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 10 Sw~ U .L. REV. 499, 521 n.107 (1978). 
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ing of de jure segregation in IPS in 1971. The ensuing nine years 
were spent vindicating the proposed remedy. Segregative intent 
still has to be found to justify an interdistrict remedy because the 
extent of any desegregation order must be justified by an 
equivalent violation.226 But a brief survey of interdistrict cases has 
shown that once a de jure intradistrict system is discovered, very 
little further proof of intent is demanded. Thus, it appears that 
Milliken, in which an interdistrict remedy was denied. is the excep-
tional case rather than the rule. 
It is also possible that Indianapolis V would have been just as 
acceptable even if it had been decided upon the racial impact theory 
denounced by Circuit Judge Tone. Indianapolis had a de jure segre-
gated school system at the time of trial, and there had been an affir-
mative duty to dismantle it since 1954. If Brown I is considered a 
court-imposed mandate to desegregate a dual system, an analogy 
can be made to the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. 
Scotland Neck City Board of Education.227 In that case, a legislature 
. 
attempted to carve out a new school district in the face of a court 
order. " '[I]f a state-imposed limitation . . . operates to inhibit or 
obstruct ... the disestablishing of a dual system, it must fall. '"228 
HACI and Uni-Gov are those "state-imposed limitations" which 
prevented "the disestablishing of a dual system." The necessary in-
tent, therefore, could have been established by this duty to desegre-
gate IPS combined with the foreseeable consequences of disparate 
racial impact and interdistrict effect from Uni-Gov and HACI ac-
tivities.229 These factors · would most likely have been sufficient in-
dications of segregative intent for a Court which had just handed 
down Columbus and Dayton II. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Unlike many commentaries on school desegregation cases, this 
one has a conclusion. There is no need to speculate as to what might 
happen in the next phase of litigation. Later issues arising in the In-
dianapolis case will not deal with the essential constitutional prob-
lem that took nine long years and almost a whole generation of 
school children to finish. 230 The case began with the IPS intradistrict 
226Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). 
227407 u.s. 484 (1972). 
228/d. at 488 (quoting North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 
(1971 )). 
2291t must be remembered that the Court has denigrated the intent standard used 
to find HACI violations, the Omaha presumption. See note 142 supra. · 
2301t will be interesting to note how the case in St. Louis will be decided in the 
wake of Indianapolis V. In the most recent St. Louis opinion, the court has required 
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violation, but the struggle centered around an interdistrict remedy 
for which no equivalent violation had initially been determined. At 
the conclusion of the lengthy litigation, the district court and the 
court of appeals justified the interdistrict relief by concluding that 
two governmental non-educational forces were motivated by segre-
gative purposes. This finding fulfilled the Supreme Court's 
desideratum that only de jure, purposefuL segregation can be 
judicially corrected. The case therefore ended with a remedy for a 
violation. 
The decision in the Indianapolis case will be difficult to follow 
because school cases make poor factual precedent. However, it is an 
excellent example of the effects of changing law and the individuality 
of each case. There probably will never be one definitive approach 
to finding segregative intent in school cases. Unlike housing and 
employment cases, school desegregation cases cannot be defined in 
terms of a single practice or decision.231 The historical backgr·ound, 
alleged violations, and school organization, among other factors, dif-
fer in school cases making them more difficult to judge than other 
kinds of equal protection litigation. 
Another difference that sets school cases apart from other equal 
protection cases is their remedies. In school desegregation cases, the 
effects of the discrimination are continuously operating upon the 
children and cannot be cured as simply as other equal protection 
violations. In housing and employment cases, an injunction or a 
remedial order for the immediate plaintiffs can be instituted. But in 
school cases, the affected parties can only receive appropriate relief 
in some form of affirmative action, such as consolidation or busing. 
The Indianapolis case also demonstrates another problem en· 
countered in most northern school cases- absent overt discrimina-
tion, courts are compelled to infer intent in these cases. There are 
no guidelines for this procedure, which creates difficulties for the 
courts. The Indianapolis case shows the weakness in this kind of 
judicial treatment because a remand to the lower courts was re-
quired as each new pertinent decision was handed down. 
But there is also strength in the flexibility inherent in this ap-
proach. Flexibility has allowed courts to look toward a result before 
a constitutional violation is actually found and to. remedy segre.-
gative conditions that are more suggestive of de facto conditions 
than de jure. The continuing nature of school desegregation viola-
tions and the adverse consequences they can enge·nder necessitate 
the joinder of outlying districts in order to determine whether an interdistrict re-medy 
would be appropriate. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1295·96 (8th Cir. 1980) 
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 88 (1980). 
231Lane, supra note 225, at 521 n.l07. 
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' 
such strong action, perhaps upon less proof of discriminatory intent 
than in other cases. This is where the Indianapolis case fits. The 
litigation was result~oriented, an approach that the Supreme Court 
seems to have accepted without quarrel. If a court can find the 
slightest indicium of segregative intent or a former de jure system . 
with a failure to affirmatively dismantle it, a desegregation order is 
not likely to be overturned absent an inequitable remedy. 
SUSAN P. STUART 
